Secret report confirms what we all know: Trial a waste of time.

Asher Moses' interesting piece in the Herald today discusses a feasibility study into ISP-filtering that the Labor Government inherited from its predecessor. For those of us who have been following the debate, there is little surprising information here. The filters are easily circumvented; they would put a burden on small ISPs; peer-to-peer would not be filtered. These and many other points have been put to the Government repeatedly yet never properly addressed - instead, they have ploughed ahead with the ill-conceived and vaguely-defined trial as if it will provide all the answers. The fact that they had detailed advice about the futility of the scheme yet still decided to proceed is a bad look for the Ministry but comes as no surprise to most of us.

In an apparent effort to head off further criticism the Minister put out a press release, with the spin being that the IIA study didn't involve empirical testing but the trial would, so comparisons aren't invalid. This is a bit of a stretch for a few reasons. Most obviously, the much-vaunted live trial does not specify which technologies are to be tested, and does not address "child-safe" dynamic filtering at all. Therefore, the technologies to be used are up to the ISPs themselves - the same entities that contributed to the report. It's therefore a mystery how the trial could come to any new conclusions that were not already flagged in this report. What has changed since February? What will ISPs learn by implementing filters of their own design in their own networks that makes the trial such a revealing exercise?

Somewhat surprisingly, the report itself has been released and rather than vindicating the policy or the trial, it serves to underscore the farcical nature of this whole initiative. The first "key finding" of the report is that

There is a need for a clear policy on the goals of any filtering system that might be implemented.

We certainly second that - an optional "cyber-safety" policy to replace PC-based filters has become, since the election, a mandatory tool to prevent the distribution of "illegal and unwanted" material online. Between these two very different policy objectives, confusion has reigned. Is it to stop hardened traffickers of child abuse material, or merely prevent accidental access to such material by innocent users? Is it, as has even been implied, to stop children viewing such material? The child-friendly filter is still a main part of the platform, yet the only hard information we have on how any filtering is to be done is that the ACMA blacklist is to be the basis. This small list is based on citizen complaints, and contains everything from truly illegal abuse material to nudity. As an example, the Minister has defended the filter as a way to "enforce existing laws" against the depictions of child sexual abuse, even though even the government does not dispute the fact that those deliberately in search of such material will be able to get around the filter.

So, even after all this time, it's still hard to describe the actual policy the Government is pursuing with any certainty. Could anyone who has ever been involved in a large IT project with ill-defined technology and goals please let us know how it turned out? (Hint: Not well.)

The IIA report makes a few other reports that remain as salient as ever, trial or no. For instance

The focus of the study was on content available in the form of web pages on the World Wide Web. This does not fully reflect the current dynamics of Internet based media.

Web filtering doesn't deal with chats, IRC, FTP, Usenet, peer-to-peer, or any form of streaming video. Yet these are the very technologies that post the greatest risks for kids or most common avenues for distribution of illegal material. How will a trial of web filters shed any new light here?

Australia has a very heterogeneous ISP industry. Depending on the nature of a mandated filtering function, the impact on industry may be significant.

Here's one area the trial will apply - it will prove that larger ISPs are better able to absorb the financial impacts of filtering, thereby penalising smaller players.

The industry is not well prepared for the implementation of content filtering systems. Our findings show that there is great disparity in the vision of how such systems should be implemented and the perceived level of difficulty in implementation.

Could there be a more succinct or timely summary of why a rushed filtering technology trial that does not specify the technology to be used is bound to fail?

There are many important legal and general business aspects that need to be addressed before a decision can be made on a filtering implementation. Frameworks need to be in place to ensure that the legal aspects and responsibility are adequately addressed.

These are just the sorts of details the country is clamouring for - who controls the list? Who is filtering aimed at? What mechanism exists to rectify mistakes? Yet no information has been forthcoming. The trial, of course, will not shed any light here.

It is evident that there are significant technical problems surrounding dynamic content filtering and its implementation in a nationwide ISP-based content filtering system. Current technology is unlikely to yield efficient and economically viable solutions for this purpose.

It has been obvious from day one that the initial, naïve vision for the filter - installing Net Nanny on the whole Internet - is unthinkable from a technical or cost standpoint. Perhaps for this reason, there is no requirement for dynamic filtering in the trial at all. One more thing that is not being addressed.

In this light, an obstinate defence of the now-delayed ISP trial seems a strange strategy for the Government. The ISPs taking part have already expressed extreme skepticism about the whole enterprise. What result is the Minister expecting - and how will he spin it?